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Abstract
Video-analytics-as-a-service is becoming an important offer-
ing for cloud providers. A key concern in such services is the
privacy of the videos being analyzed. While trusted execution
environments (TEEs) are promising options for preventing
the direct leakage of private video content, they remain vul-
nerable to side-channel attacks. We present Visor, a system
that provides confidentiality for the user’s video stream as
well as the ML models in the presence of a compromised
cloud platform and untrusted co-tenants. Visor executes video
pipelines in a hybrid TEE that spans both CPU and GPU
enclaves. It protects against any side-channel attack induced
by data-dependent access patterns of video modules, and also
protects the CPU-GPU communication channel. Visor is up to
1000× faster than naïve oblivious solutions, and its overheads
relative to a non-oblivious baseline are limited to 2×–6×.
1 Introduction
Cameras are being deployed pervasively for the many appli-
cations they enable, such as traffic planning, retail experience,
and enterprise security [96, 103, 104]. Videos from the cam-
eras are streamed to the cloud, where they are processed using
video analytics pipelines [45, 49, 114] composed of computer
vision techniques (e.g., OpenCV [77]) and convolutional neu-
ral networks (e.g., object detector CNNs [82]); as illustrated in
Figure 1. Indeed, “video-analytics-as-a-service” is becoming
an important offering for cloud providers [2, 64].
Privacy of the video contents is of paramount concern in the
“video analytics-as-a-service” offerings. Videos often contain
sensitive information, such as users’ home interiors, people in
workspaces, or license plates of cars. For example, the Kuna
home monitoring service [52] transmits videos from users’
homes to the cloud, analyzes the videos, and notifies users
when it detects movement in areas of interest. For user privacy,
video streams must remain confidential and not be revealed
to the cloud provider or other co-tenants in the cloud.
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) [62, 106] are a nat-
ural fit for privacy-preserving video analytics in the cloud. In
contrast to cryptographic approaches such as homomorphic
encryption, TEEs rely on the assumption that cloud tenants
also trust the hardware. The hardware provides the ability to
create secure “enclaves” that are protected against privileged
attackers. TEEs are more compelling than cryptographic tech-
niques since they are orders of magnitude faster. In fact, CPU
TEEs (e.g., Intel SGX [62]) lie at the heart of confidential
cloud computing [40, 63]. Meanwhile, recent advancements
in GPU TEEs [42, 106] enable the execution of ML models
such as neural networks with strong privacy guarantees as
well. CPU and GPU TEEs thus present an opportunity for
building privacy-preserving video analytics systems.
Unfortunately, TEEs (e.g., Intel SGX) are vulnerable to
a host of side-channel attacks (e.g., [13, 14, 108, 110]). For
instance, in §2.3 we show that by observing just the mem-
ory access patterns of a widely used bounding box detection
OpenCV module, an attacker can infer the exact shapes and
positions of all moving objects in the video. In general, an
attacker can infer crucial information about the video being
processed, such as the times when there is activity, objects
that appear in the video frame, all of which when combined
with knowledge about the physical space being covered by
the camera, can lead to serious violations of confidentiality.
We present Visor, a system for privacy-preserving video
analytics services. Visor protects the confidentiality of the
videos being analyzed from the service provider and other
co-tenants. When tenants host their own CNN models in
the cloud, it also protects the model parameters and weights.
Visor protects against a powerful enclave attacker who can
compromise the software stack outside the enclave, as well
as observe any data-dependent accesses to network, disk, or
memory via side-channels (similar to prior work [75, 81]).
1.1 Techniques and Contributions
Visor makes two primary contributions. First, we present a
privacy-preserving framework for CNN-based ML services
that span CPU and GPU resources. This framework can po-
tentially power applications beyond video analytics, such as
recommendation systems, financial forecasting, and document
analysis. Second, we develop novel data-oblivious algorithms
with provable privacy guarantees within our MLaaS frame-
work, for commonly used vision modules. The modules are
efficient and can be composed together to construct many
different vision pipelines. In designing our modules, we for-
mulate a set of design principles that can be broadly applied
to other vision modules as well.
Privacy-preserving MLaaS Framework. Visor leverages
a hybrid TEE that spans CPU and GPU resources available in
the cloud. Recent work has shown that scaling video analytics
pipelines requires judicious use of both CPUs and GPUs [37,
79]. Some pipeline modules can run on CPUs at the required
frame rates (e.g., video decoding or vision algorithms) while
others (e.g., CNNs) require GPUs, as shown in Figure 1. Thus,
our solution spans both CPU and GPU TEEs, and combines
them into a unified trust domain.
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Visor systematically addresses access-pattern-based leak-
age across the components of the hybrid TEE, from video
ingestion to CPU-GPU communication to CNN processing.
In particular, we take the following steps:
a) Visor leverages a suite of data-oblivious primitives to
remove access pattern leakage from the CPU TEE. The
primitives enable the development of oblivious modules
with provable privacy guarantees, the access patterns of
which are always independent of private data.
b) Visor relies on a novel oblivious communication proto-
col to remove leakage from the CPU-GPU channel. As
the CPU modules serve as filters, the data flow in the
CPU-GPU channel (on which objects of each frame are
passed to the GPU) leaks information about the contents
of each frame, enabling attackers to infer the number of
moving objects in a frame. At a high level, Visor pads the
channel with dummy objects, leveraging the observation
that our application is not constrained by the CPU-GPU
bandwidth. To reduce GPU wastage, Visor intelligently
minimizes running the CNN on the dummy objects.
c) Visor makes CNNs running in a GPU TEE oblivious by
leveraging branchless CUDA instructions to implement
conditional operations (such as ReLU and max pooling)
in a data-oblivious way.
Efficient Oblivious Vision Pipelines. Next, we design
novel data-oblivious algorithms for vision modules that are
foundational for video analytics, and implement them using
the oblivious primitives provided by the framework above. Vi-
sion algorithms are used in video analytics pipelines to extract
the moving foreground objects. These algorithms—e.g., back-
ground subtraction, bounding box detection, object cropping,
and tracking—run on CPUs and serve as cheap filters to dis-
card frames instead of invoking expensive CNNs on the GPU
for each frame’s objects (more in §2.1). The modules can be
composed to construct many different vision pipelines—e.g.,
medical imaging, facial recognition, and motion tracking.
As we demonstrate in §8, naïve approaches for making
these algorithms data-oblivious, such that their operations
are independent of each pixel’s value, can slow down video
pipelines by several orders of magnitude. Instead, we carefully
craft oblivious vision algorithms for each module in the video
analytics pipeline, including the popular VP8 video decoder
[5]. Specifically, we distill a set of design principles based
on the properties of these modules, and use them to devise
novel algorithms that are also efficient. At a high level: first,
we employ a divide-and-conquer approach to enhance the
tractability of our algorithms. Second, we transform each
algorithm into a form that scans the image while identically
processing each pixel. Third, we amortize the cost of each
algorithm across groups of pixels. We discuss this strategy
in more detail in §5, but we note that it can potentially help
inform the design of other oblivious vision modules as well,
beyond the ones we consider in Visor.
We also employ a range of optimizations to boost perfor-
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(a) Pipeline with object classifier (e.g., ResNet).
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(b) Pipeline with object detector (e.g., Yolo).
Figure 1: Video analytics pipelines. Pipeline (a) extracts the ob-
jects using vision algorithms and classifies the cropped objects
using a CNN classifier on the GPU. Pipeline (b) also uses the vi-
sion algorithms as a filter, but sends the entire frame to the CNN
detector. Both pipelines may optionally use object tracking.
mance further by: designing vectorizable algorithms that use
data-parallel (SIMD) instructions; refactoring the algorithms
to benefit from cache locality; and exploiting properties of the
video streams, such as maximum size of objects. Collectively,
our design strategy and optimizations improve performance
by up to 1000× over naïve solutions.
Finally, prior work has shown that beyond access pattern
leakage at the cloud, bitrate variations in encrypted network
traffic can also leak information about the underlying video
streams [87]. To prevent this leakage, we modify the video
encoder to carefully pad video streams at the source in a way
that optimizes the video decoder’s latency. Visor thus provides
an end-to-end solution for the privacy of vision pipelines.
1.2 Evaluation Highlights
We have implemented Visor on Intel SGX CPU enclaves [62]
and Graviton GPU enclaves [106]. We evaluate Visor on
commercial video streams of cities and datacenter premises
containing sensitive data. Our evaluation shows that Visor’s
vision components perform up to 1000× better than naïve
oblivious solutions, and over 6 to 7 orders of magnitude better
than a state-of-the-art general-purpose system for oblivious
program execution. Against a non-oblivious baseline, Visor’s
overheads are limited to 2×–6× which still enables us to
analyze multiple streams simultaneously in real-time on our
testbed. Visor is versatile and can accommodate different
combinations of vision components used in real-world appli-
cations. Thus, Visor provides an efficient solution for private
video analytics.
2 Background and Motivation
2.1 Video Analytics as a Service
Figure 1 depicts the canonical pipelines for video analyt-
ics [37, 49, 65, 113, 114]. The client (e.g., a source camera)
feeds the video stream to the service hosted in the cloud,
which (a) decodes the video into frames, (b) extracts objects
from the frames using vision algorithms, and (c) classifies
the objects using a pre-trained convolutional neural network
(CNN). Cameras typically offer the ability to control the reso-
lution and frame rate at which the video streams are encoded.
Recent work demonstrates that scaling video analytics
pipelines requires judicious use of both CPUs and GPUs [37,
79]. In Visor, we follow the example of Microsoft’s Rocket
platform for video analytics [65, 66]—we split the pipelines
by running video decoding and vision modules on the CPU,
while offloading the CNN to the GPU (as shown in Figure 1).
The vision modules process each frame to detect the moving
“foreground” objects in the video using background subtrac-
tion [10], compute each object’s bounding box [94], and crop
them from the frame for the CNN classifier. These vision
modules can sustain the typical frame rates of videos even
on CPUs, thereby serving as vital “filters” to reduce the ex-
pensive CNN operations on the GPU [37, 49], and are thus
widely used in practical deployments. For example, CNN
classification in Figure 1(a) is invoked only if moving objects
are detected in a region of interest in the frame. Optionally,
the moving objects are also tracked to infer directions (say,
cars turning left). The CNNs can either be object classifiers
(e.g., ResNet [36]) as in Figure 1(a); or object detectors (e.g.,
Yolo [82]) as in Figure 1(b), which take whole frames as
input. The choice of pipeline modules is application depen-
dent [37, 45] and Visor targets confidentiality for all pipeline
modules, their different combinations, and vision CNNs.
While our description focuses on a multi-tenant cloud ser-
vice, our ideas equally apply to multi-tenant edge compute
systems, say, at cellular base stations [24]. Techniques for
lightweight programmability on the cameras to reduce net-
work traffic (e.g., using smart encoders [105] or dynamically
adapting frame rates [3]) are orthogonal to Visor’s techniques.
2.2 Trusted Execution Environments
Trusted execution environments, or enclaves, protect applica-
tion’s code and data from all other software in a system. Code
and data loaded in an enclave—CPU and GPU TEEs—can
be verified by clients using the remote attestation feature.
Intel SGX [62] enables TEEs on CPUs and enforces isolation
by storing enclave code and data in a protected memory region
called the Enclave Page Cache (EPC). The hardware ensures
that no software outside the enclave can access EPC contents.
Graviton [106] enables TEEs on GPUs in tandem with
trusted applications hosted in CPU TEEs. Graviton prevents
an adversary from observing or tampering with traffic (data
and commands) transferred to/from the GPU. A trusted GPU
runtime (e.g., CUDA runtime) hosted in a CPU TEE attests
that all code/data have been securely loaded onto the GPU.
2.3 Attacks based on Access Pattern Leakage
TEEs are vulnerable to leakage from side-channel attacks that
exploit micro-architectural side-channels [13,14,21,30,35,55,
67, 88, 89], software-based channels [15, 110], or application-
specific leakage, such as network and memory accesses.
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Figure 2: Attacker obtains all the frame’s objects (right) using
access pattern leakage in the bounding box detection module.
A large subset of these attacks exploit data-dependent mem-
ory access patterns (e.g., branch-prediction, cache-timing, or
controlled page fault attacks). Xu et al. [110] show that by
simply observing the page access patterns of image decoders,
an attacker can reconstruct entire images. We ourselves an-
alyzed the impact of access pattern leakage at cache-line
granularity [13, 30, 67, 89] on the bounding box detection
algorithm [94] (see Figure 1(a); §2.1). We simulated exist-
ing attacks by capturing the memory access trace during an
execution of the algorithm, and then examined the trace to
reverse-engineer the contents of the input frame. Since im-
ages are laid out predictably in memory, we found that the
attacker is able to infer the locations of all the pixels touched
during execution, and thus, the shapes and positions of all ob-
jects (as shown in Figure 2). Shapes and positions of objects
are the core content of any video, and knowing them allows
the attacker to infer sensitive information like times when
patients are visiting private medical centers or when residents
are inside a house, and even infer if the individuals are babies
or on wheelchairs based on their size and shapes. In fact, con-
versations with customers of one of the largest public cloud
providers indeed confirm that privacy of the videos is among
their top-two concerns in signing up for the video analytics
cloud service.
3 Threat Model and Security Guarantees
We describe the attacker’s capabilities and lay out the attacks
that are in scope and out of scope for our work.
3.1 Video Streams and CNN Model
Each client owns its video streams, and it expects to protect
its video from the cloud and co-tenants of the video analytics
service. The vision algorithms are assumed to be public.
We assume that the CNN model’s architecture is public,
but its weights are private and may be proprietary to either
the client or the cloud service. Visor maintains the privacy of
the weights in both scenarios. However, when the weights are
proprietary to the cloud service, the client application may be
able to learn some information about the weights by analyzing
the results of the pipeline [26, 27, 98]. Such attacks are out of
scope for Visor.
Finally, recent work has shown that the camera’s TLS traffic
leaks the video’s bitrate variation to an attacker observing the
network [87], which may consequently leak information about
the video contents. Visor eliminates this leakage by padding
the video segments at the camera, in such way that optimizes
the latency of decoding the padded stream at the cloud (§6.1).
3.2 Hardware enclaves and side-channels
Our trusted computing base includes: (i) the GPU package
and its enclave implementation, (ii) the CPU package and its
enclave implementation, and (iii) the video analytics pipeline
implementation and GPU runtime hosted in the CPU enclave.
The design of Visor is not tied to any specific hardware
enclave; instead, Visor builds on top of an abstract model of
hardware enclaves where the attacker controls the server’s
entire software stack outside of the enclave (including the
OS), but cannot perform any attacks to glean information from
inside the processor (including processor keys). The attacker
can additionally observe the contents and access patterns of
all (encrypted) pages in memory, for both data and code. We
assume that the attacker can observe the enclave’s memory
access patterns at cache line granularity [75]. Note that our
attacker model includes the cloud service provider as well as
other co-tenants.
We instantiate Visor with the widely-deployed Intel SGX
enclave. However, recent attacks show that SGX does not
quite satisfy the abstract enclave model that Visor requires.
For example, attackers may be able to distinguish intra cache
line memory accesses [68, 112]. In Visor, we prevent these
attacks by disabling hyperthreading in the underlying system,
disallowing attackers from observing intra-core side-channels;
clients can verify that hyperthreading is disabled during re-
mote attestation [4]. One may also employ complementary
solutions for closing hyperthreading-based attacks [19, 76].
Other attacks that violate our abstract enclave model are out
of scope, as they exploit leakage or vulnerabilities other than
the application’s access patterns: such as timing analysis or
power consumption [69,95], DoS attacks [33,43], or rollback
attacks [78] (which have complementary solutions [11, 61]).
Transient execution attacks (e.g., [14, 18, 80, 88, 100–102])
are also out of scope; these attacks violate the threat model
of SGX and are typically patched promptly by the vendor via
microcode updates. In future, one could swap out Intel SGX
in our implementation for upcoming enclaves [9, 54] that do
not suffer from the above drawbacks of SGX.
Visor provides protection against any channel of attack that
exploits data-dependent access patterns within our abstract
enclave model, which represent a large class of known attacks
on enclaves (e.g., cache attacks [13, 30, 35, 67, 89], branch
prediction [55], paging-based attacks [15,110], or memory bus
snooping [53]). We note that even if co-tenancy is disabled
(which comes at considerable expense), privileged software
such as the OS and hypervisor can still infer access patterns
(e.g., by monitoring page faults), thus still requiring data-
oblivious solutions.
Recent work has shown side-channel leakage on GPUs [46,
47, 70, 71] including the exploitation of data access patterns
out of the GPU. We expect similar attacks to be mounted on
GPU enclaves as video and ML workloads gain in popularity,
and our threat model applies to GPU enclaves as well.
3.3 Provable guarantees for Visor’s data-obliviousness
Visor provides data-obliviousness—i.e., confidentiality of the
video streams’ contents—within our abstract enclave model
from §3.2; we rely on the enclaves themselves to provide
integrity, along with authenticated encryption.
We formulate our confidentiality guarantees using the “sim-
ulation paradigm” [28]. First, we define a trace of observa-
tions that the attacker sees in our threat model. Then, we
define the public information, i.e., information we do not at-
tempt to hide and is known to the attacker. Using these, we
argue that there exists a simulator, such that for all videos
V , when given only the public information (about V and the
video algorithms), the simulator can produce a trace similar
to an attacker who observes the access patterns during Visor’s
processing of V . By “similar”, we mean that no polynomial-
time attacker can distinguish between the simulated trace and
the real trace observed by the attacker. The fact that a simula-
tor can produce the same observations as an adversary even
without knowing the private data in the video stream implies
that the video is hidden.
In our attacker model, the trace of observations is the se-
quence of the addresses of memory references to code as well
as data, along with the accessed data (which is encrypted).
The public information is all of Visor’s algorithms, formatting
and sizing information, but not the video data. For efficiency,
Visor also takes as input some public parameters that rep-
resent various upper bounds on the properties of the video
streams, e.g., the maximum number of objects per frame, or
upper bounds on object dimensions.
In Appendix A, we provide a formal definition of data-
obliviousness (Definition 1); a summary of public information
for each algorithm; and proofs of security along with detailed
pseudocode for each algorithm. Since Visor’s data-oblivious
algorithms (§6 and §7) follow an identical sequence of mem-
ory accesses that depend only on public information and are
independent of data content, our proofs are easy to verify.
4 A Privacy-Preserving MLaaS Framework
In this section, we present a privacy-preserving framework
for CNN-based machine learning services that span CPU and
GPU resources. Though Visor seeks to protect video analyt-
ics pipelines, our framework can more broadly be used for
a range of MLaaS applications. Building upon prior work,
the framework comprises three key features that collectively
enable data-oblivious execution of ML services. First, it iso-
lates the computation in ML pipelines using a hybrid TEE
that spans both the CPU and GPU. Second, it provides a
secure CPU-GPU communication channel that additionally
prevents the leakage of information via traffic patterns. Third,
it prevents access-pattern-based leakage on the GPU by im-
plementing data-oblivious CNN inference, and facilitates the
development of data-oblivious modules on the CPU using a
suite of optimized primitives.
While we describe the features of our framework using the
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Figure 3: Visor’s hybrid TEE architecture. Locks indicate en-
crypted data channels, and keys indicate decryption points.
video analytics pipeline as a running example, the features
themselves are broadly applicable to other MLaaS applica-
tions as well.
4.1 Hybrid TEE Architecture
Figure 3 shows Visor’s architecture. Visor receives encrypted
video streams from the client’s camera, which are then fed to
the video processing pipeline. We refer to the architecture as
a hybrid TEE as it spans both the CPU and GPU TEEs, with
different modules of the video pipeline (§2.1) being placed
across these TEEs. We follow the example of prior work that
has shown that running the non-CNN modules of the pipeline
on the CPU, and the CNNs on the GPU [37, 65, 79], results
in efficient use of the expensive GPU resources while still
keeping up with the incoming frame rate of videos.
Regardless of the placement of modules across the CPU
and GPU, we note that attacks based on data access patterns
can be mounted on both CPU and GPU TEEs, as explained in
§3.2. As such, our data-oblivious algorithms and techniques
are broadly applicable irrespective of the placement, though
our description is based on non-CNN modules running on the
CPU and the CNNs on the GPU.
CPU and GPU TEEs. We implement the CPU TEE using
Intel SGX enclaves, and the GPU TEE using Graviton secure
contexts [106]. The CPU TEE also runs Graviton’s trusted
GPU runtime, which enables Visor to securely bootstrap the
GPU TEE and establish a single trust domain across the TEEs.
The GPU runtime talks to the untrusted GPU driver (running
on the host outside the CPU TEE) to manage resources on the
GPU via ioctl calls. In Graviton, each ioctl call is trans-
lated to a sequence of commands submitted to the command
processor. Graviton ensures secure command submission (and
subsequently ioctl delivery) as follows: (i) for task submis-
sion, the runtime uses authenticated encryption to protect
commands from being dropped, replayed, or reordered, and
(ii) for resource management, the runtime validates signed
summaries returned by the GPU upon completion. The GPU
runtime encrypts all inter-TEE communication.
We port the non-CNN video modules (Figure 1) to SGX
enclaves using the Graphene LibOS [99]. In doing so, we
instrument Graphene to support the ioctl calls that are used
by the runtime to communicate with the GPU driver.
Pipeline Execution. The hybrid architecture requires us to
protect against attacks on the CPU TEE, GPU TEE, and the
CPU-GPU channel. As Figure 3 illustrates, Visor decrypts the
video stream inside the CPU TEE, and obliviously decodes
out each frame (in §6). Visor then processes the decoded
frames using oblivious vision algorithms to extract objects
from each frame (in §7). Visor extracts the same number of
objects of identical dimensions from each frame (some of
which are dummies, up to an upper-bound) and feeds them
into a circular buffer. This avoids leaking the actual number of
objects in each frame and their sizes; the attacker can observe
accesses to the buffer, even though objects are encrypted.
Objects are dequeued from the buffer and sent to the GPU
(§4.2) where they are decrypted and processed obliviously by
the CNN in the GPU TEE (§4.3).
4.2 CPU-GPU Communication
Although the CPU-GPU channel in Figure 3 transfers en-
crypted objects, Visor needs to ensure that its traffic patterns
are independent of the video content. Otherwise, an attacker
observing the channel can infer the processing rate of objects,
and hence the number (and size) of the detected objects in
each frame. To address this leakage, Visor ensures that (i) the
CPU TEE transfers the same number of objects to the GPU
per frame, and (ii) CNN inference runs at a fixed rate (or
batch size) in the GPU TEE. Crucially, Visor ensures that
the CNN processes as few dummy objects as possible. While
our description focuses on Figure 1(a) to hide the processing
rate of objects of a frame on the GPU, our techniques directly
apply to the pipeline of Figure 1(b) to hide the processing rate
of complete frames using dummy frames.
Since the CPU TEE already extracts a fixed number of
objects per frame (say kmax) for obliviousness, we enforce an
inference rate of kmax for the CNN as well, regardless of the
number of actual objects in each frame (say k). The upper
bound kmax is easy to learn for each video stream in practice.
However, this leads to a wastage of GPU resources, which
must now also run inference on (kmax−k) dummy objects per
frame. To limit this wastage, we develop an oblivious protocol
that leads to processing as few dummy objects as possible.
Oblivious protocol. Visor runs CNN inference on k′(<<
kmax) objects per frame. Visor’s CPU pipeline extracts kmax
objects from each frame (extracting dummy objects if needed)
and pushes them into the head of the circular buffer (Figure 3).
At a fixed rate (e.g., once per frame, or every 33ms for a 30fps
video), k′ objects are dequeued from the tail of the buffer and
sent to the GPU that runs inference on all k′ objects.
We reduce the number of dummy objects processed by the
GPU as follows. We sort the buffer using osort in ascending
order of “priority” values (dummy objects are assigned lower
priority), thus moving dummy objects to the head of the buffer
and actual objects to the tail. Dequeuing from the tail of the
buffer ensures that actual objects are processed first, and that
dummy objects at the head of the buffer are likely overwritten
before being sent to the GPU. The circular buffer’s size is set
large enough to avoid overwriting actual objects.
The consumption (or inference) rate k′ should be set relative
to the actual number of objects that occur in the frames of the
video stream. Too high a value of k′ results in GPU wastage
due to dummy inferences, while too low a value leads to delay
in the processing of the objects in the frame (and potentially
overwriting them in the circular buffer). In our experiments,
we use a value of k′ = 2×kavg (kavg is the average number of
objects in a frame) that leads to little delay and wastage.
Bandwidth consumption. The increase in traffic on the
CPU-GPU PCIe bus (Figure 3) due to additional dummy ob-
jects for obliviousness is not an issue because the bus is not
bandwidth-constrained. Even with Visor’s oblivious video
pipelines, we measure the data rate to be <70 MB/s, in con-
trast to the several GB/s available in PCIe interconnects.
4.3 CNN Classification on the GPU
The CNN processes identically-sized objects at a fixed rate
on the GPU. The vast majority of CNN operations, such as
matrix multiplications, have inherently input-independent ac-
cess patterns [31, 75]. The operations that are not oblivious
can be categorized as conditional assignments. For instance,
the ReLU function, when given an input x, replaces x with
max(0,x); likewise, the max-pooling layer replaces each value
within a square input array with its maximum value.
Oblivious implementation of the max operator may use
CUDA max/fmax intrinsics for integers/ floats, which get com-
piled to IMNMX/FMNMX instructions [74] that execute the max
operation branchlessly. This ensures that the code is free of
data-dependent accesses, making CNN inference oblivious.
4.4 Oblivious modules on the CPU
After providing a data-oblivious CPU-GPU channel and CNN
execution on the GPU, we address the video modules (in Fig-
ure 1) that execute on the CPU. We carefully craft oblivious
versions of the video modules using novel efficient algorithms
(which we describe in the subsequent sections). To implement
our algorithms, we use a set of oblivious primitives which we
summarize below.
Oblivious primitives. We use three basic primitives, similar
to prior work [75, 81, 86]. Fundamental to these primitives is
the x86 CMOV instruction, which takes as input two registers—
a source and a destination—and moves the source to the
destination if a condition is true. Once the operands have been
loaded into registers, the instructions are immune to memory-
access-based pattern leakage because registers are private
to the processor, making any register-to-register operations
oblivious by default.
1) Oblivious assignment (oassign). The oassign primi-
tive is a wrapper around the CMOV instruction that condition-
ally assigns a value to the destination operand. This primitive
can be used for performing dummy write operations by simply
setting the input condition to false. We implement multiple
versions of this primitive for different integer sizes. We also
implement a vectorized version using SIMD instructions.
2) Oblivious sort (osort). The osort primitive oblivi-
ously sorts an array with the help of a bitonic sorting net-
work [7]. Given an input array of size n, the network sorts the
array by performing O(n log2(n)) compare-and-swap opera-
tions, which can be implemented using the oassign primitive.
As the network layout is fixed given the input size n, execution
of each network has identical memory access patterns.
3) Oblivious array access (oaccess). The oaccess prim-
itive accesses the i-th element in an array, without leaking
the value of i. The simplest way of implementing oaccess is
to scan the entire array. However, as discussed in our threat
model (§3.2), hyperthreading is disabled, preventing any shar-
ing of intra-core resources (e.g., L1 cache) with an adversary,
and consequently mitigating known attacks [68, 112] that
can leak access patterns at sub-cache-line granularity using
shared intra-core resources. Therefore, we assume access pat-
tern leakage at the granularity of cache lines, and it suffices
for oaccess to scan the array at cache-line granularity for
obliviousness, instead of per element or byte.
5 Designing Oblivious Vision Modules
We seek to design novel and efficient oblivious vision algo-
rithms as we find that naïve approaches and generic tools can
lead to prohibitive performance overheads. For instance, a
naïve approach for implementing oblivious versions of CPU
video analytics modules (as in Figure 1) is to simply rewrite
them using the oblivious primitives outlined in §4.4. Such an
approach: (i) eliminates all branches and replaces conditional
statements with oassign operations to prevent control flow
leakage via access patterns to code, (ii) implements all array
accesses via oaccess to prevent leakage via memory accesses
to data, and (iii) performs all iterations for a fixed number of
times while executing dummy operations when needed. The
simplicity of this approach, however, comes at the cost of high
overheads: two to three orders of magnitude. Furthermore,
as we show in §8.3, generic tools for executing programs
obliviously [1, 56, 81, 92] also have massive overheads—six
to seven orders of magnitude.
Instead, we demonstrate that by carefully crafting oblivious
vision modules using the primitives outlined in §4.4, Visor im-
proves performance over naïve approaches by several orders
of magnitude. In the remainder of this section, we present
an overview of our design strategy, before diving into the
detailed design of our algorithms in §6 and §7.
5.1 Design Strategy
The design of our oblivious algorithms is informed by a com-
mon set of observations across vision modules. Based on
these observations, we distill a set of unifying principles that
we apply in our algorithms.
Divide-and-conquer for improving performance. We
break down each vision algorithm into independent subrou-
tines and make each subroutine oblivious individually, to en-
hance the tractability of the overall solution.
Component Input parameters
Video decoding (§6) Number of bits used to encode each
(padded) row of blocks;
Background sub. (§7.1) –
Bounding box detec-
tion (§7.2)
(i) Maximum number of objects per
image; (ii) Maximum number of dif-
ferent labels that can be assigned to
pixels (an object consists of all labels
that are adjacent to each other).
Object cropping (§7.3) Upper bounds on object dimensions.
Object tracking (§7.4) (i) An upper bound on the intermedi-
ate number of features; (ii) An upper
bound on the total number of features.
CNN Inference (§4.3) –
Figure 4: Public input parameters in Visor’s oblivious modules.
Scan-based sequential processing. Data-oblivious process-
ing of images demands that each pixel in the image be indis-
tinguishable from the others. This requirement presents an op-
portunity to revisit the design of sequential image processing
algorithms. Instead of naïvely rewriting existing algorithms
using data-oblivious primitives, we find that recasting the al-
gorithm into a form that scans the image, while applying the
same functionality to each pixel, yields superior performance.
Intuitively, this is because any non-sequential pixel access
implicitly requires a scan of the image for obliviousness (e.g.,
using oaccess); by transforming the algorithm into a scan-
based algorithm, we get rid of such non-sequential accesses.
Amortize cost across groups of pixels. Processing each
pixel in an identical manner lends itself naturally to optimiza-
tion strategies that enable batched computation over pixels—
e.g., the use of data-parallel (SIMD) instructions.
In Visor, we follow the general strategy above to design obliv-
ious versions of popular vision modules that can be composed
and reused across diverse pipelines—e.g., medical imaging,
facial recognition, and motion tracking. However, our strat-
egy can potentially help inform the design of other oblivious
vision modules as well, beyond the ones we consider.
5.2 Input parameters for oblivious algorithms
Our oblivious algorithms rely on a set of public input parame-
ters that need to be provided to Visor before the deployment
of the video pipelines. These parameters represent various
upper bounds on the properties of the video stream, such as
the maximum number of objects per frame, or the maximum
size of each object. Figure 4 summarizes the list of input
parameters across all the modules of the vision pipeline.
There are multiple ways by which these parameters may
be determined. (i) The model owner may obtain these param-
eters simultaneously while training the model on a public
dataset. (ii) The client may perform offline empirical analysis
of their video streams and choose a reasonable set of param-
eters. (iii) Visor may also be augmented to compute these
parameters dynamically, based on historical data (though we
do not implement this). We note that providing these parame-
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Figure 5: Flowchart of the encoding process.
ters is not strictly necessary, but meaningful parameters can
significantly improve the performance of our algorithms.
6 Oblivious Video Decoding
Video encoding converts a sequence of raw images, called
frames, into a compressed bitstream. Frames are of two types:
keyframes and interframes. Keyframes are encoded to only
exploit redundancy across pixels within the same frame. In-
terframes, on the other hand, use the prior frame as reference
(or the most recent keyframe), and thus can exploit temporal
redundancy in pixels across frames.
Encoding overview. We ground our discussion using the
VP8 encoder [5], but our techniques are broadly applicable.
A frame is decomposed into square arrays of pixels called
blocks, and then compressed using the following steps (see
Figure 5). 1 An estimate of the block is first predicted using
reference pixels (in a previous frame if interframe or the
current frame if keyframe). The prediction is then subtracted
from the actual block to obtain a residue. 2 Each block in
the residue is transformed into the frequency domain (e.g.,
using a discrete cosine transform), and its coefficients are
quantized thus improving compression. 3 Each (quantized)
block is compressed into a variable-sized bitstream using a
binary prefix tree and arithmetic encoding. Block prediction
modes, cosine transformation, and arithmetic encoding are
core to all video encoders (e.g., H264 [34], VP9 [107]) and
thus our oblivious techniques carry over to all popular codecs.
The decoder reverses the steps of the encoder: (i) the in-
coming video bitstream is entropy decoded (§6.2); (ii) the
resulting coefficients are dequantized and inverse transformed
to obtain the residual block (§6.3); and (iii) previously de-
coded pixels are used as reference to obtain a prediction block,
which are then added to the residue (§6.4).
6.1 Video encoder padding
While the video stream is in transit, the bitrate variation of
each frame is visible to an attacker observing the network
even if the traffic is TLS-encrypted. This variability can be ex-
ploited for fingerprinting video streams [87] and understand-
ing its content. Overcoming this leakage requires changes to
the video encoder to “pad” each frame with dummy bits to
an upper bound before sending the stream to Visor.
We modify the video encoder to pad the encoded video
streams. However, instead of applying padding at the level
of frames, we pad each individual row of blocks within the
frames. Compared to frame-level padding, padding individual
rows of blocks significantly improves latency of oblivious
decoding, but at the cost of an increase in network bandwidth.
Padding the frames of the video stream, however, negates
the benefit of using interframes during encoding of the
raw video stream, which are typically much smaller than
keyframes. We therefore configure the encoder to encode all
raw video frames into keyframes, which eliminates the added
complexity of dealing with interframes, and consequently
simplifies the oblivious decoding procedure.
We note that it may not always be possible to modify legacy
cameras to incorporate padding. In such cases, potential solu-
tions include the deployment of a lightweight edge-compute
device that pads input camera feeds before streaming them to
the cloud. For completeness, we also discuss the impact of the
lack of padding in Appendix B, along with the accompanying
security-performance tradeoff.
6.2 Bitstream decoding
The bitstream decoder reconstructs blocks with the help of
a prefix tree. At each node in the tree it decodes a single bit
from the compressed bitstream via arithmetic decoding, and
traverses the tree based on the value of the bit. While decoding
the bit, the decoder first checks whether any more bits can
be decoded at the current bitstream position, and if not, it
advances the bitstream pointer by two bytes. Once it reaches
a leaf node, it outputs a coefficient based on the position of
the leaf, and assigns the coefficient to the current pixel in the
block. This continues for all the coefficients in the frame.
Requirements for obliviousness. The above algorithm
leaks information about the compressed bitstream. First, the
traversal of the tree leaks the value of the parsed coefficient.
For obliviousness, we need to ensure that during traversal, the
identity of the current node being processed remains secret.
Second, not every position in the bitstream encodes the same
number of coefficients, and the bitstream pointer advances
variably during decoding. Hence, this leaks the number of
coefficients that are encoded per two-byte chunk (which may
convey their values). We design a solution that decouples the
parsing of coefficients, i.e., prefix tree traversal (§6.2.1), from
the assignment of the parsed coefficients to pixels (§6.2.2).
6.2.1 Oblivious prefix tree traversal
A simple way to make tree traversal oblivious is to represent
the prefix tree as an array. We can then obliviously fetch any
node in the tree using oaccess (§4.4). Though this hides
the identity of the fetched node, we need to also ensure that
processing of the nodes does not leak their identity.
In particular, we need to ensure that nodes are indistin-
guishable from each other by performing an identical set of
operations at each node. Unfortunately, this requirement is
complicated by the following facts. (1) Only leaf nodes in
the tree produce outputs (i.e., the parsed coefficients) and
not the intermediate nodes. (2) We do not know beforehand
which nodes in the tree will cause the bitstream pointer to be
advanced; at the same time, we need to ensure that the pointer
is advanced predictably and independent of the bitstream. To
solve these problems, we take the following steps.
1) We modify each node to output a coefficient regardless of
whether it is a leaf state or not. Leaves output the parsed
coefficient, while other states output a dummy value.
2) We introduce a dummy node into the prefix tree. While
traversing the tree, if no more bits can be decoded at the
current bitstream position, we transition to the dummy
node and perform a bounded number of dummy decodes.
These modifications ensure that while traversing the prefix
tree, all that an attacker sees is that at some node in the tree, a
single bit was decoded and a single value was outputted.
Note that in this phase, we do not assign coefficients to
pixels, and instead collect them in a list. If we were to assign
coefficients to pixels in this phase, then the decoder would
need to obliviously scan the entire frame (using oaccess) at
every node in the tree, in order to hide the pixel’s identity.
Instead, by decoupling parsing from assignment, we are able
to perform the assignment obliviously using a super-linear
number of accesses (instead of quadratic), as we explain next.
6.2.2 Oblivious coefficient assignment
At the end of §6.2.1, we have a list of actual and dummy
coefficients. The key idea is that if we can obliviously sort this
set of values using osort such that all the actual coefficients
are contiguously ordered while all dummies are pushed to the
front, then we can simply read the coefficients off the end of
the list sequentially and assign them to pixels one by one.
To enable such a sort, we modify the prefix tree traversal
to additionally output a tuple (flag,index) per coefficient;
flag is 0 for dummies and 1 otherwise; index is an increasing
counter as per the pixel’s index. Then, the desired sort can be
achieved by sorting the list based on the value of the tuple.
As the complexity of oblivious sort is super-linear in the
number of elements being sorted, an important optimization is
to decode and assign coefficients to pixels at the granularity of
rows of blocks rather than frames. While the number of bits per
row of blocks may be observed, the algorithm’s obliviousness
is not affected as each row of blocks in the video stream is
padded to an upper bound (§6.1); had we applied frame-level
padding, this optimization would have revealed the number of
bits per row of blocks. In §8.1.1, we show that this technique
improves oblivious decoding latency by ∼6×.
6.3 Dequantization and inverse transformation
The next step in the decoding process is to (i) dequantize the
coefficients decoded from the bitstream, followed by (ii) in-
verse transformation to obtain the residual blocks. Dequanti-
zation just multiplies each coefficient by a quantization factor.
The inverse transformation also performs a set of identical
arithmetic operations irrespective of the coefficient values.
6.4 Block prediction
Prediction is the final stage in decoding. The residual block
obtained after §6.3 is added to a predicted block, obtained us-
ing a previously constructed block as reference, to obtain the
raw pixel values. In keyframes, each block is intra-predicted—
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Figure 6: Oblivious bounding box detection
i.e., it uses a block in the same frame as referenced. We do not
discuss interframes because as described in §6.1, the padded
input video streams in Visor only contain keyframes.
Intra-predicted blocks are computed using one of several
modes. A mode to encode a block refers to a combination of
pixels on its top row and left column used as reference. Obliv-
iousness requires that the prediction mode remains private.
Otherwise, an attacker can identify the pixels that are most
similar to each other, thus revealing details about the frame.
We make intra-prediction oblivious by evaluating all pos-
sible predictions for the pixel and storing them in an array,
indexing each prediction by its mode. Then, we use oaccess
to obliviously select the correct prediction from the array.
7 Oblivious Image Processing
After obliviously decoding frames in §6, the next step as
shown in Figure 1 is to develop data-oblivious techniques for
background subtraction (§7.1), bounding box detection (§7.2),
object cropping (§7.3), and tracking (§7.4). We present the key
ideas here; detailed pseudocode and proofs of obliviousness
are available in Appendix A.2. Note that §7.1 and §7.4 modify
popular algorithms to make them oblivious, while §7.2 and
§7.3 propose new oblivious algorithms.
7.1 Background subtraction
The goal of background subtraction is to detect moving ob-
jects in a video. Specifically, it dynamically learns stationary
pixels that belong to the video’s background, and then sub-
tracts them from each frame, thus producing a binary image
with black background pixels and white foreground pixels.
Zivkovic et al. proposed a mechanism [115, 116] that is
widely used in practical deployments, that models each pixel
as a mixture of Gaussians [10]. The number of Gaussian
components M differs across pixels depending on their value
(but is no more than Mmax, a pre-defined constant). As more
data arrives (with new frames), the algorithm updates each
Gaussian component along with their weights (pi), and adds
new components if necessary.
To determine if a pixel~x belongs to the background or not,
the algorithm uses the B Gaussian components with the largest
weights and outputs true if p(~x) is larger than a threshold:
p(~x) =
B
∑
m=1
pimN (~x |~µm,Σm)
where~µm and Σm are parameters of the Gaussian components,
and pim is the weight of the m-th Gaussian component.
This algorithm is not oblivious because it maintains a dif-
ferent number of Gaussian components per pixel, and thus
performs different steps while updating the mixture model per
pixel. These differences are visible via access patterns, and
these leakages reveal to an attacker how complex a pixel is in
relation to others—i.e., whether a pixel’s value stays stable
over time or changes frequently. This enables the attacker to
identify the positions of moving objects in the video.
For obliviousness, we need to perform an identical set of
operations per pixel (regardless of their value); we thus always
maintain Mmax Gaussian components for each pixel, of which
(Mmax−M) are dummy components and assigned a weight
pi= 0. When newer frames arrive, we use oassign operations
to make all the updates to the mixture model, making dummy
operations for the dummy components. Similarly, to select the
B largest components by weight, we use the osort primitive.
7.2 Bounding box detection
The output from §7.1 is a binary image with black back-
ground pixels where the foreground objects are white blobs
(Figure 6(a)). To find these objects, it suffices to find the edge
contours of all blobs. These are used to compute the bound-
ing rectangular box of each object. A standard approach for
finding the contours in a binary image is the border following
algorithm of Suzuki and Abe [94]. As the name suggests,
the algorithm works by scanning the image until it locates
an edge pixel, and then follows the edge around a blob. As
Figure 2 in §2.3 illustrated, the memory access patterns of
this algorithm leak the details of all the objects in the frame.
A naïve way to make this algorithm oblivious is to imple-
ment each pixel access using the oaccess primitive (along
with other minor modifications). However, we measure that
this approach slows down the algorithm by over ∼1200×.
We devise a two-pass oblivious algorithm for computing
bounding boxes by adapting the classical technique of con-
nected component labeling (CCL) [84]. The algorithm’s main
steps are illustrated in Figure 6(a) (whose original binary im-
age contains two blobs). In the first pass, it scans the image
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Figure 7: Oblivious object cropping
and assigns each pixel a temporary label if it is “connected”
to other pixels. In the second pass, it merges labels that are
part of a single object. Even though CCL on its own is less
efficient for detecting blobs than border following, it is far
more amenable to being adapted for obliviousness.
We make this algorithm oblivious as follows. First, we
perform identical operations regardless of whether the current
pixel is connected to other pixels. Second, for efficiency, we
restrict the maximum number of temporary labels (in the first
pass) to a parameter N provided as input to Visor (per §5.2,
Figure 4). Note that the value of the parameter may be much
lower than the worst case upper bound (which is the total
number of pixels), and thus is more efficient.
Enhancement via parallelization. We observe that the
oblivious algorithm can be parallelized using a divide-and-
conquer approach. We divide the frame into horizontal stripes
( 1 in Figure 6(b)) and process each stripe in parallel ( 2 ).
For objects that span stripe boundaries, each stripe outputs
only a partial bounding box containing the pixels within the
stripe. We combine the partial boxes by re-applying the obliv-
ious CCL algorithm to the boundaries of adjacent stripes ( 3 ).
Given two adjacent stripes Si and Si+1 one below the other, we
compare each pixel in the top row of Si+1 with its neighbors
in the bottom row of Si, and merge their labels as required.
7.3 Object cropping
The next step after detecting bounding boxes of objects is to
crop them out of the frame to be sent for CNN classification
(Figure 1(a)). Visor needs to ensure that the cropping of ob-
jects does not leak (i) their positions, or (ii) their dimensions.
7.3.1 Hiding object positions
A naïve way of obliviously cropping an object of size p×q is
to slide a window (of size p×q) horizontally in raster order,
and copy the window’s pixels if it aligns with the object’s
bounding box. Otherwise, perform a dummy copy. This, how-
ever, leads to a slow down of 4000×, with the major reason
being redundant copies: while sliding the window forward by
one pixel results in a new position in the frame, a majority of
the pixels copied are the same as in the previous position.
We get rid of this redundancy by decoupling the algorithm
into multiple passes—one pass along each dimension of the
image—such that each pass performs only a subset of the
work. As Figure 7(a) shows, the first phase extracts the hori-
zontal strip containing the object; the second phase extracts
the object from the horizontal strip.
1 Instead of sliding a window (of size p×q) across the
frame (of size m×n), we use a horizontal strip of m×q that
has width m equal to that of the frame, and height q equal
to that of the object. We slide the strip vertically down the
frame row by row. If the top and bottom edges of the strip
are aligned with the object, we copy all pixels covered by the
strip into the buffer; otherwise, we perform dummy copies.
2 We allocate a window of size p×q equal to the object’s
size and then slide it column by column across the extracted
strip in 1 . If the left and right edges of the window are
aligned with the object’s bounding box, we copy the window’s
pixels into the buffer; if not, we perform dummy copies.
Algorithm 4 in Appendix A.2 provides the detailed steps.
7.3.2 Hiding object dimensions
The algorithm in §7.3.1 leaks the dimensions p×q of the ob-
jects. To hide object dimensions, Visor takes as input parame-
ters P and Q representing upper bounds on object dimensions
(as described in §5.2, Figure 4), and instead of cropping out
the exact p×q object, we obliviously crop out a larger image
of size P×Q that subsumes the object. While the object sizes
vary depending on their position in the frame (e.g., near or
far from the camera), the maximum values (P and Q) can be
learned from profiling just a few sample minutes of the video,
and they tend to remain unchanged in our datasets.
This larger image now contains extraneous pixels surround-
ing the object, which might lead to errors during the CNN’s
object classification. We remove the extraneous pixels sur-
rounding the p×q object by obliviously scaling it up to fill
the P×Q buffer. Note that all objects we send to the CNN
across the CPU-GPU channel are of size P×Q (§4.2), and
recall from §4.1 that we extract the same number of objects
from each frame (by padding dummy objects, if needed).
We develop an oblivious routine for scaling up using bi-
linear interpolation [41]. Bilinear interpolation computes the
value of a pixel in the scaled up image using a linear com-
bination of a 2× 2 array of pixels from the original image
(see Figure 7(b)). We once again use decoupling of the algo-
rithm into two passes to improve its efficiency (Figure 7(c))
by scaling up along a single dimension per pass.
Cache locality. Since the second pass of our (decoupled
bilinear interpolation) algorithm performs column-wise inter-
polations, each pixel access during the interpolation touches
a different cache line. To exploit cache locality, we transpose
the image before the second pass, and make the second pass
to also perform row-wise interpolations (as in the first pass).
This results in another order of magnitude speedup (§8.1.4).
7.4 Object Tracking
Object tracking consists of two main steps: feature detection
in each frame and feature matching across frames.
Feature detection. SIFT [58, 59] is a popular algorithm for
extracting features for keypoints, i.e., pixels that are the most
“valuable” in the frame. In a nutshell, it generates candidate
keypoints, where each candidate is a local maxima/minima;
the candidates are then filtered to get the legitimate keypoints.
Based on the access patterns of the SIFT algorithm, an
attacker can infer the locations of all the keypoints in the
image, which in turn, can reveal the location of all object
“corners” in the image. A naïve way of making the algorithm
oblivious is to treat each pixel as a keypoint, performing all
the above operations for each. However, the SIFT algorithm’s
performance depends critically on its ability to filter out a
small set of good keypoints from the frame.
To be oblivious and efficient, Visor takes as input two pa-
rameters Ntemp and N (per Figure 4). The parameter Ntemp rep-
resents an upper bound on the number of candidate keypoints,
and N on the number of legitimate keypoints. These parame-
ters, coupled with oassign and osort, allow for efficient and
oblivious identification of keypoints. Finally, computing the
feature descriptors for each keypoint requires accessing the
pixels around it. For this, we use oblivious extraction (§7.3).
Appendix A.2’s Algorithm 6 has the pseudocode.
Feature matching. The next step after detecting features is
to match them across images. Feature matching computes a
distance metric between two sets of features, and identifies
features that are “nearest” to each other in the two sets. In
Visor, we simply perform brute-force matching of the two
sets, using oassign operations to select the closest features.
8 Evaluation
Implementation. We implement our oblivious video de-
coder atop FFmpeg’s VP8 decoder [25] and oblivious vision
algorithms atop OpenCV 3.2.0 [77]. We use Caffe [44] for
running CNNs. We encrypt data channels using AES-GCM.
We implement the oblivious primitives of §4.4 using inline
assembly code (as in [75, 81, 86]), and manually verified the
binary to ensure that compiler optimizations do not undo our
intent; one can also use tools such as Vale [8] to do the same.
Testbed. We evaluate Visor on Intel i7-8700K with 6 cores
running at 3.7 GHz, and an NVIDIA GTX 780 GPU with
2304 CUDA cores running at 863 MHz. We disable hyper-
threading for experiments with Visor (per §3), but retain hyper-
threading in the insecure baseline. Disabling hyperthreading
for security does not sacrifice the performance of Visor (due
to its heavy utilization of vector units) unlike the baseline
system that favors hyperthreading; see Appendix C for more
details. The server runs Linux v4.11; supports AVX2 and
SGX-v1 instruction sets; and has 32 GB of memory, with
93.5 MB of enclave memory. The GPU has 3 GB of memory.
Datasets. We use four real-world video streams (obtained
with permission) in our experiments: streams 1 and 4 are from
traffic cameras in the city of Bellevue (resolution 1280×720)
while streams 2 and 3 are sourced from cameras surveilling
commercial datacenters (resolution 1024×768).
All these videos are privacy-sensitive as they involve gov-
ernment regulations or business sensitivity. For experiments
that evaluate the cost of obliviousness across different res-
olutions and bitrates, we re-encode the videos accordingly.
A recent body of work [45, 49, 114] has found that the accu-
racy of object detection in video streams is not affected if the
resolution is decreased (while consuming significantly lesser
resources), and 720p videos suffice. We therefore chose to use
streams closer to 720p in resolution because we believe they
would be a more accurate representation of real performance.
Evaluation highlights. We summarize the key takeaways
of our evaluation.
1) Visor’s optimized oblivious algorithms (§6, §7) are up to
1000× faster than naïve competing solutions. (§8.1)
2) End-to-end overhead of obliviousness for real-world video
pipelines with state-of-the-art CNNs are limited to 2×–6×
over a non-oblivious baseline. (§8.2)
3) Visor is generic and can accommodate multiple pipelines
(§2.1; Figure 1) that combine the different vision process-
ing algorithms and CNNs. (§8.2)
4) Visor’s performance is over 6 to 7 orders of magnitude
better than a state-of-the-art general-purpose system for
oblivious program execution. (§8.3)
Overall, Visor’s use of properties of the video streams has no
impact on the accuracy of the analytics outputs.
8.1 Performance of oblivious components
We begin by studying the performance of Visor’s oblivious
modules: we quantify the raw overhead of our algorithms
(without enclaves) over non-oblivious baselines; we also mea-
sure the improvements they provide compared to naïve obliv-
ious solutions.
8.1.1 Oblivious video decoding
Decoding of the compressed bitstream dominates decoding
latency, consuming up to ∼90% of the total latency. Further,
this stage is dominated by the oblivious assignment subroutine
which sorts coefficients into the correct pixel positions using
osort, consuming up to∼83% of the decoding latency. Since
the complexity of oblivious sort is super-linear in the number
of elements being sorted, our technique for decoding at the
granularity of rows of blocks rather than frames significantly
improves the latency of oblivious decoding.
Overheads. Figure 8 shows the bandwidth usage and decod-
ing latency for different oblivious decoding strategies (i.e.,
decoding at the level of frames, or at the level of row of blocks)
for a video stream of resolution 1280×720. We also include
two reference points: non-encoded frames and VP8 encoding.
The baseline latency of decoding VP8 encoded frames is 4–
5 ms. Non-encoded raw frames incur no decoding latency but
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Figure 12: Latency of oblivi-
ous bounding box detection.
result in frames that are three orders of magnitude larger than
the VP8 average frame size (10s of kB) at a bitrate of 4 Mb/s.
Frame-level oblivious decoding introduces high latency
(∼850 ms), which is two orders of magnitude higher than
non-oblivious counterparts. Furthermore, padding each frame
to prevent leakage of the frame’s bitrate increases the average
frame size to ∼95 kB. On the contrary, oblivious decoding at
the level of rows of blocks delivers ∼140 ms, which is ∼6×
lower than frame-level decoding. However, this comes with a
modest increase in network bandwidth as the encoder needs
to pad each row of blocks individually, rather than a frame. In
particular, the frame size increases from ∼95 kB to ∼140 kB.
Apart from the granularity of decoding, the latency of the
oblivious sort is also governed by: (i) the frame’s resolution,
and (ii) the bitrate. The higher the frame’s resolution / bi-
trate, the more coefficients there are to be sorted. Figure 9
plots oblivious decoding latency at the granularity of rows
of blocks across video streams with different resolutions and
bitrates. The figure shows that lower resolution/bitrates intro-
duce lower decoding overheads. In many cases, lower image
qualities are adequate for video analytics as it does not impact
the accuracy of the object classification [45].
8.1.2 Background subtraction
We set the maximum number of Gaussian components per
pixel Mmax = 4, following prior work [115,116]. Our changes
for obliviousness enable us to make use of SIMD instructions
for updating the Gaussian components in parallel. This is
because we now maintain the same number of components per
pixel, and update operations for each component are identical.
Figure 10 plots the overhead of obliviousness on back-
ground subtraction across different resolutions. The SIMD
implementation increases the latency of the routine only by
1.8× over the baseline non-oblivious routine. As the routine
processes each pixel in the frame independent of the rest, its
latency increases linearly with the total number of pixels.
8.1.3 Bounding box detection
For non-oblivious bounding box detection, we use the border-
following algorithm of Suzuki and Abe [94] (per §7.2); this
algorithm is efficient, running in sub-millisecond latencies.
The performance of our oblivious bounding box detection
algorithm is governed by two parameters: (i) the number
of stripes used in the divide-and-conquer approach, which
controls the degree of parallelism, and (ii) an upper bound L
on the maximum number of labels possible per stripe, which
determines the size of the algorithm’s data structures.
Figure 11 plots L for streams of different frame resolutions
while varying the number of stripes into which each frame
is divided. As expected, as the number of stripes increases,
the value of L required per stripe decreases. Similarly, lower
resolution frames require smaller values of L.
Figure 12 plots the latency of detecting all bounding boxes
in a frame based on the value of the parameter L, ranging
from a few milliseconds to hundreds of milliseconds. For
a given resolution, the latency decreases as the number of
stripes increase, due to two reasons: (i) increased parallelism,
and (ii) smaller sizes of L required per stripe. Overall, the
divide-and-conquer approach reduces latency by an order of
magnitude down to a handful of milliseconds.
8.1.4 Object cropping
We first evaluate oblivious object cropping while leaking ob-
ject sizes. We include three variants: the naïve approach; the
two-phase approach; and a further optimization that advances
the sliding window forward multiple rows/columns at a time.
Figure 13 plots the cost of cropping variable-sized objects
from a 1280×720 frame, showing that the proposed refine-
ments reduce latency by three orders of magnitude .
Figure 14 plots the latency of obliviously resizing the target
ROI within a cropped image to hide the object’s size. While
the latency of naïve bilinear interpolation is high (10s of mil-
liseconds) for large objects, the optimized two-pass approach
(that exploits cache locality by transposing the image before
the second pass; §7.3.2) reduces latency by two orders of
magnitude down to one millisecond for large objects.
Figure 13: Oblivious object cropping.
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Figure 14: Oblivious object resizing.
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Figure 15: Oblivious object tracking.
8.1.5 Object tracking
Figure 15 plots the latency of object tracking with and without
obliviousness. We examine our sample streams at various res-
olutions to determine upper bounds on the maximum number
of features in frames. As the resolution increases, the over-
head of obliviousness increases as well because our algorithm
involves an oblivious sort of the intermediate set of detected
features, the cost of which is superlinear in the size of the set.
Overall, the overhead is < 2×.
8.1.6 CNN classification on GPU
Buffer. Figure 17 benchmarks the sorting cost as a function
of the object size and the buffer size. For buffer sizes smaller
than 50, the sorting cost remains under 5 ms.
Inference. We measure the performance of CNN object
classification on the GPU. As discussed in §4.3, oblivious
inference comes free of cost. Figure 16 lists the throughput of
different CNN models using the proprietary NVIDIA driver,
with CUDA version 9.2. Each model takes as input a batch
of 10 objects of size 224×224. Further, since GPU memory
is limited to 3 GB, we also list the maximum number of con-
current models that can run on our testbed. As we show in
§8.2, the latter has a direct bearing on the number of video
analytics pipelines that can be concurrently served.
8.2 System performance
We now evaluate the end-to-end performance of the video
analytics pipeline using four real video streams. We present
the overheads of running Visor’s data-oblivious techniques
and hosting the pipeline in a hybrid enclave. We evaluate
the two example pipelines in Figure 1: pipeline 1 uses an
object classifier CNN; pipeline 2 uses an object detector CNN
(Yolo), and performs object tracking on the CPU.
Pipeline 1 configuration. We run inference on objects that
are larger than 1% of the frame size as smaller detected objects
do not represent any meaningful value. Across our videos,
the number of such objects per frame is small—no frame has
more than 5 objects, and 97-99% of frames have less than
2 to 3 objects. Therefore, we configure: (i) Visor’s object
detection stage to conservatively output 5 objects per frame
(including dummies) into the buffer, (ii) the consumption rate
of Visor’s CNN module to 2 or 3 objects per frame (depending
on the stream), and (iii) the buffer size to 50, which suffices
to prevent non-dummy objects from being overwritten.
Pipeline 2 configuration. The Yolo object detection CNN
ingests entire frames, instead of individual objects. In the
baseline, we filter frames that don’t contain any objects using
background subtraction. However, we forego this filtering in
the oblivious version since most frames contain foreground
objects in our sample streams. Additionally, Yolo expects the
frames to be of resolution 448×448. So we resize the input
video streams to be of the same resolution.
Cost of obliviousness. Figures 18 and 19 plot the overhead
of Visor on the CPU-side components of pipelines 1 and 2,
while varying the number of concurrent pipelines. Visor re-
duces peak CPU throughput by ∼2.6×–6× across the two
pipelines, compared to the non-oblivious baseline. However,
the throughput of the system ultimately depends on the num-
ber of models that can fit in GPU memory.
Figure 20 plots Visor’s end-to-end performance for both
pipelines, across all four sample video streams. In the pres-
ence of CNN inference, Visor’s overheads depend on the
model complexity. Pipelines that utilize light models, such as
AlexNet and ResNet-18, are bottlenecked by the CPU. In such
cases, the overhead is determined by the cost of oblivious-
ness incurred by the CPU components. With heavier models
such as ResNet-50 and VGG, the performance bottleneck
shifts to the GPU. In this case, the overhead of Visor is gov-
erned by the amount of dummy objects processed by the GPU
(as described in §4.2). Overall, the cost of obliviousness re-
mains in the range of 2.2×–5.9× across video streams for
the first pipeline. In the second pipeline, the overhead is∼2×.
The GPU can fit only a single Yolo model. The overall per-
formance, however, is bottlenecked at the CPU because the
object tracking routine is relatively expensive.
Cost of enclaves. We measure the cost of running the
pipelines in CPU/GPU enclaves by replacing the NVIDIA
stack with Graviton’s stack, which comprises open-source
CUDA runtime (Gdev [51]) and GPU driver (Nouveau [73]).
Figure 21 compares Visor against a non-oblivious base-
line when both systems are hosted in CPU/GPU enclaves. As
SGX’s EPC size is limited to 93.5 MB, workloads with large
memory footprints incur high overhead. For pipeline 1, and
for large frame resolutions, the latency of background sub-
traction increases from ∼6 ms to 225 ms due to its working
set size being 132 MB. In Visor, the pipeline’s net latency
increases by 2.4× (as SGX overheads mask some of Visor’s
CNN Batches/s Max no. of models
AlexNet 40.3 7
ResNet-18 18.4 4
ResNet-50 8.2 1
VGG-16 5.4 1
VGG-19 4.4 1
Yolo 3.9 1
Figure 16: CNN throughput (batch size 10).
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Figure 18: CPU throughput (pipeline 1).
2 4 6 8 10 12
No. of concurrent pipelines (w/o CNN)
20
40
60
80
C
P
U
 T
hr
ou
gh
pu
t (
F
ra
m
es
/s
)
Stream 1
Stream 2
Oblivious
Baseline
Figure 19: CPU throughput (pipeline 2).
AlexNet ResNet-18 ResNet-50 VGG-16 VGG-19
CNN model used in pipeline 1
4
8
16
32
64
128
256
N
et
 T
hr
ou
gh
pu
t (
F
ra
m
es
/s
)
5.9× 5.1× 2.5× 2.2× 2.2×
Baseline
Oblivious
Yolo
Pipeline 2
4
8
16
32
64
128
256
2.0×
Figure 20: Overall pipeline throughput.
Pipeline 1 
(1280 × 720)
Pipeline 1
(320 × 180)
Pipeline 20
250
500
750
1000
1250
L
at
en
cy
 (
m
s)
2.4×
2.3×
1.7×
Baseline w/ enclaves
Oblivious w/enclaves
Figure 21: Cost of enclaves.
overheads) while increasing the memory footprint to 190 MB.
When the pipeline operates on lower frame resolutions, such
that its memory footprint fits within current EPC, the latency
of the non-oblivious baseline tracks the latency of the inse-
cure baseline (a few milliseconds); the additional overhead of
obliviousness is 2.3×.
For pipeline 2, the limited EPC increases the latency of
object tracking from ∼90 ms to ∼240 ms. With Visor’s obliv-
iousness, the net latency increases by 1.7×.
8.3 Comparison with related work
We conclude our evaluation by comparing Visor against Ob-
fuscuro [1], a state-of-the-art general-purpose system for
oblivious program execution.
The current implementation of Obfuscuro supports a lim-
ited set of instructions, and hence cannot run the entire video
analytics pipeline. On this note, we ported the OpenCV object
cropping module to Obfuscuro, which requires only simple
assignment operations. Cropping objects of size 128× 128
and 16×16 (from a 1280×720 image) takes 8.5 hours and 8
minutes in Obfuscuro respectively, versus 800 µs and 200 µs
in Visor; making Visor faster by over 6 to 7 orders of mag-
nitude. We note, however, that Obfuscuro targets stronger
guarantees than Visor as it also aims to obfuscate the pro-
grams; hence, it is not a strictly apples-to-apples comparison.
Nonetheless, the large gap in performance is hard to bridge,
and our experiments demonstrate the benefit of Visor’s cus-
tomized solutions.
Other tools for automatically synthesizing or executing
oblivious programs are either closed-source [81, 109], require
special hardware [56,60,72], or require custom language sup-
port [17]. However, we note that the authors of Raccoon [81]
(which provides similar levels of security as Visor) report up
to 1000× overhead on toy programs; the overhead would ar-
guably be higher for complex programs like video analytics.
9 Discussion
Attacks on upper bounds. For efficiency, Visor extracts a
fixed number of objects per frame based on a user-specified
upper bound. However, this leaves Visor open to adversarial
inputs: an attacker who knows this upper bound can attempt
to confuse the analytics pipeline by operating many objects
in the frame at the same time.
To mitigate such attacks, we suggest two potential strate-
gies: (i) For frames containing >= N objects (as detected in
§7.2), process those frames off the critical path using worst–
case bounds (e.g., total number of pixels). While this approach
leaks which specific frames contain>=N objects, the leakage
may be acceptable considering these frames are suspicious.
(ii) Filter objects based on their properties like object size or
object location: e.g., for a traffic feed, only select objects at
the center of the traffic intersection. This limits the number of
valid objects possible per frame, raising the bar for mounting
such attacks. One can also apply richer filters on the pipeline
results and reprocess frames with suspicious content.
Oblivious-by-design encoding. Instead of designing oblivi-
ous versions of existing codecs, it may be possible to construct
an oblivious-by-design coding scheme that is (i) potentially
simpler, and (ii) performs better than Visor’s oblivious de-
coding. This alternate design point is an interesting direc-
tion for future work. We note, however, that any such codec
would need to produce a perfectly constant bitrate (CBR)
per frame to prevent bitrate leakage over the network. While
CBR codecs have been explored in the video literature, they
are inferior to variable bitrate schemes (VBR) such as VP8
because they are lossier. In other words, an oblivious CBR
scheme would consume greater bandwidth than VP8 to match
its video quality (and therefore, VP8 with padding), though it
may indeed be simpler. In Visor, we optimize for quality.
10 Related work
To the best of our knowledge, Visor is the first system for the
secure execution of vision pipelines. We discuss prior work
related to various aspects of Visor.
Video processing systems. A wide range of optimizations
have been proposed to improve the efficiency of video ana-
lytic pipelines [37, 45, 49, 114]. These systems offer different
design points for enabling trade-offs between performance
and accuracy. Their techniques are complementary to Visor
which can benefit from their performance efficiency.
Data-oblivious techniques. Eppstein et al. [23] develop
data-oblivious algorithms for geometric computations. Ohri-
menko et al. [75] propose data-oblivious machine learning
algorithms running inside CPU TEEs. These works are simi-
lar in spirit to Visor, but are not applicable to our setting.
Oblivious RAM [29] is a general-purpose cryptographic
solution for eliminating access-pattern based side-channels.
While recent advancements have reduced its computational
overhead [93], it still remains several orders of magnitude
more expensive than customized solutions. Various sys-
tems [1, 17, 56, 60, 72, 81, 92, 109] also offer generic solutions
for hiding access patterns at different levels, with the help of
ORAM, specialized hardware, or compiler-based techniques.
Generic solutions, however, are less efficient than customized
solutions (such as Visor) which can exploit algorithmic pat-
terns for greater efficiency.
Side-channel defenses for TEEs. Visor provides systemic
protection against attacks that exploit access pattern leakage
in enclaves. Systems for data-oblivious execution (such as
Obfuscuro [1] and Raccoon [81]) provide similar levels of
security for general-purpose workloads, while Visor is tailored
to vision pipelines.
In contrast, a variety of defenses have also been proposed
to detect [20] or mitigate specific classes of access-pattern
leakage. For example, Cloak [32], Varys [76], and Hyper-
race [19] target cache-based attacks; while T-SGX [90] and
Shinde et al. [91] propose defenses for paging-based attacks.
DR.SGX [12] mitigates access pattern leakage by frequently
re-randomizing data locations, but can leak information if the
enclave program makes predictable memory accesses.
Telekine [38] mitigates side-channels in GPU TEEs in-
duced by CPU-GPU communication patterns, similar to Vi-
sor’s oblivious CPU-GPU communication protocol (though
the latter is specific to Visor’s use case).
Secure inference. Several recent works propose crypto-
graphic solutions for CNN inference [22,48,57,83,85] relying
on homomorphic encryption and/or secure multi-party com-
putation [111]. While cryptographic approaches avoid the
pitfalls of TEE-based CNN inference, the latter remains faster
by orders of magnitude [39, 97].
11 Conclusion
We presented Visor, a system that enables privacy-preserving
video analytics services. Visor uses a hybrid TEE architec-
ture that spans both the CPU and the GPU, as well as novel
data-oblivious vision algorithms. Visor provides strong con-
fidentiality and integrity guarantees, for video streams and
models, in the presence of privileged attackers and malicious
co-tenants. Our implementation of Visor shows limited per-
formance overhead for the provided level of security.
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A Security proofs and pseudocode
We now provide detailed pseudocode along with proofs of
security for our algorithms. We start by providing a formal
definition of data-obliviousness.
Let traceA(x) be the trace of observations that the adver-
sary can make during an execution of an algorithm A, when
given some input x, i.e., the sequence of accessed memory ad-
dresses, along with the (encrypted) data that is read or written
to the addresses. To prove that the algorithm is data-oblivious,
we show that there exists a simulator program that can pro-
duce a trace T indistinguishable from traceA(x), when given
only the public parameters for the algorithm, and regardless
of the value of x. Since T does not depend on any private
data, the indistinguishability of T and traceA implies that
the latter leaks no information about the private data to the
adversary, and only depends on the public parameters. The
following definition captures the definition formally.
Definition 1 (Data-obliviousness). We say than an algorithm
A is data-oblivious if there exists a polynomial-time simulator
S such that for any input x
traceA(x)≡ S(L(A))
where L(A) is the leakage function and represents the public
parameters of A.
Component Public parameters
Video decoding (i) Metadata of video stream (format,
frame rate, resolution); (ii) Number of
bits used to encode each (padded) row
of blocks; (iii) Maximum number of bits
encoded per 2-byte chunk.
Background sub. –
Bounding box det. (i) Maximum number of objects per im-
age; (ii) Maximum number of different
labels that can be assigned to pixels (an
object consists of all labels that are adja-
cent to each other).
Object cropping Upper bounds on object dimensions.
Object tracking (i) An upper bound on the intermediate
number of features; (ii) An upper bound
on the total number of features.
CNN Inference CNN architecture.
Overall Modules and algorithms used in the
pipeline.
Figure 22: Summary of public parameters in Visor’s oblivi-
ous vision modules observable by the attacker. These consist of
the input parameters provided to Visor, along with information
leaked by Visor (such as frame rate and resolution).
We now prove the security of each of our algorithms with
respect to Definition 1 in the following subsections. Figure 22
summarizes the public parameters across Visor oblivious vi-
sion modules that are leaked to the attacker.
A.1 Oblivious video decoding
Algorithm 1 provides detailed pseudocode for oblivious de-
coding the bitstream into pixel coefficients during video de-
coding, as described in §6.2. We first explain the pseudocode
in more detail, following the high-level description of §6.2.
In our implementation, we model the prefix tree as a finite
state machine (FSM). While traversing the tree, we decode
a single bit at each state (i.e., each node in the tree) using
the ENTROPYDECODE subroutine. This subroutine takes in
a pointer ptr to the bitstream, and decodes a single bit from
the bitstream via arithmetic operations. If no more bits can be
decoded at the current position, it outputs null; otherwise, it
outputs the decoded bit 0 or 1.
To enable decoding and traversal, each state S (i.e., each
node in the tree) is a structure containing four fields: (prob,
next0,next1,type). Here, prob is the probability that the
bit to be decoded at S is 0 (as defined in the VP8 specifica-
tions [6]); and next0 and next1 are the indices of the next
state based on whether the decoded bit is a 0 or 1. Some states
in the FSM are end states, i.e., states that complete recon-
structing a data value; for these states, type is set to ‘end’.
States that are not end states (i.e., decode intermediate bits)
have type set to ‘mid’. The FSM also contains a dummy
state Sdummy that performs dummy bit decodes by invoking
the entropy decoder with isDummy set to true; for the dummy
state, type is set to ‘dummy’.
Algorithm 1 Bitstream decoding
1: Constants: Upper bound on number of encoded bits per 2-byte
chunk in bitstream Nchunk; total number of bits in bitstream
Nbits; array representation of the prefix tree for decoding Nodes
2: Globals: The data value being decoded data; counter ctr that
counts the number of bits decoded per chunk in the bitstream
3: Input: Bitstream B
4: procedure DECODEBITSTREAM(B)
5: ptr= B.start
6: S = Nodes[1]
7: Sparent = null, data= 0, ctr= 0, pos= 0
8: O = [ ]
9: while ptr< B.start+Nbits do
10: isDummy = (S.type == ‘dummy’)
11: b = ENTROPYDECODE(isDummy,ptr,S.prob)
12: isDummy = (b == null)
13: data= UPDATEDATA(isDummy,data,b)
14: pos+= 1
15: ctr= oassign(ctr== Nchunk,0,ctr+1)
16: isEnd = (S.type == ‘end’)
17: o1 = oassign(isEnd,pos,0)
18: o2 = oassign(isEnd,data,null)
19: parent= oassign(¬isDummy,S.index,Sparent.index)
20: next= oassign(b == 0,S.next0,S.index)
21: next= oassign(b == 1,S.next1,next)
22: next= oassign(isDummy,0,next)
23: next= oassign(isDummy∧
ctr== Nchunk,parent,next)
24: O.APPEND((o1,o2))
25: Sparent = oaccess(Nodes,parent)
26: S = oaccess(Nodes,next)
27: ptr= oassign(ctr== Nchunk,ptr+2,ptr)
28: end while
29: osort(O)
30: return O
31: end procedure
Next, we represent the FSM as an array—Nodes in Algo-
rithm 1. We set Nodes[0] to be Sdummy, and Nodes[1] to be
the starting state. This enables us to implement transitions
to any state S j by simply fetching the state at index j from
the array using the oaccess primitive. As a result, the cur-
rent state of the FSM remains hidden across transitions. Each
transition passes four items of information to the next state:
(i) the state that made the transition Sparent; (ii) an integer
pos that denotes the position in the bitstream of the current
bit being decoded; (iii) the (partially) constructed data value
data, and (iv) a counter ctr that counts the number of bits
decoded at each position. Note that the structure of the prefix
tree (and hence the array Nodes) is public information since
it is constructed per the VP8 specifications [6].
Theorem 1. The bitstream decoding algorithm in Algorithm 1
is data-oblivious per Definition 1, with public parameters
Nbits, Nchunk, and the size of the prefix tree array Nodes
(which is a known constant).
Proof. The simulator starts be generating a random bitstream
B of length Nbits, and then simply executes Algorithm 1. It
outputs the trace produced by the algorithm.
Lines 5–8 have fixed access patterns.
The loop in line 9 runs a fixed number of times: ctr in-
crements by 1 in each run of the loop on line 15 until it
becomes equal to Nchunk, at which point the loop variable ptr
is incremented by 2 in line 27. Thus, the loop makes exactly
Nbits×Nchunk/2 iterations.
Within the loop, line 10 has fixed access patterns. In line
11, the function ENTROPYDECODE dereferences ptr and
decodes a single bit from the dereferenced value using simple
arithmetic operations; if isDummy is true it performs dummy
operations instead, using oassign. Its access patterns thus
only depend on the location pointed to by ptr within the
bitstream B, and not the contents of the bitstream. Further,
the value of the loop variable ptr is incremented per a fixed
schedule (as described above), and thus only depends on the
value of Nbits.
Line 12 has fixed access patterns. In line 13, the func-
tion UPDATEDATA updates the value of data with b using
arithmetic operations implemented using oassign. Its access
patterns are thus independent of the data or b.
Lines 14–24 have fixed access patterns. The access patterns
of lines 25–26 only depend on the length of Nodes, which is
fixed and public. Line 27 also has fixed access patterns.
Finally, line 29 uses the osort primitive to sort the array
O; its access patterns thus depend on the length of O. Since
a single tuple is appended to O per iteration of the loop, the
length of O is equal to the number of iterations, which only
depends on Nbits and Nchunk as described above.
Thus, the trace produced by the algorithm can be simulated
only using the values of Nbits and Nchunk.
A.2 Oblivious image processing
In this section, we provide pseudocode along with proofs of
security for the image processing algorithms described in §7.
For each algorithm, we first briefly describe its pseudocode,
and then prove its security with respect to Definition 1.
A.2.1 Background subtraction
As described in §7.1, the background subtraction algorithm
(Algorithm 2) maintains a mixture of M Gaussian components
per pixel. Let~x(t) denote the value of a pixel in RGB at time
t. The algorithm uses the value of the pixel to update each
Gaussian component via a set of arithmetic operations (lines
5–8 in the pseudocode) along with their weights pim such
that, over time, components that represent background values
for the pixel come to have larger weights, while foreground
values are represented by components having smaller weights.
Then, it compute the distance of the sample from each of
the M components. If no component is sufficiently close, it
adds a new component, increments M, and if the new M >
Mmax, discards the component with the smallest weight pim
(lines 9–21).
Algorithm 2 Background subtraction
1: Constants: Maximum number of Gaussian components Mmax,
number of components to count towards background decision
B; threshold measures δthr, c f , and cthr
2: Globals: Actual number of Gaussian components M, array of
Gaussian components GMM of size Mmax
3: Input: Pixel x
4: procedure BACKGROUNDSUBTRACTION(x)
5: for m = 1 to Mmax do
6: isDummy= (m > M)
7: UPDATEGAUSSIAN(isDummy,GMM[m],x)
8: end for
9: SORTBYWEIGHT(GMM)
10: isClose= false
11: for m = 1 to Mmax do
12: δ= GETDISTANCE(GMM[m],x)
13: isClose= isClose∨ (δ> δthr)
14: end for
15: M = oassign(isClose∧ (M < Mmax),M+1,M)
16: G = GENERATEGAUSSIAN()
17: GMM[Mmax−1] = oassign(isClose,GMM[Mmax−1],G)
18: for m = Mmax-1 to 1 do
19: toSwap= (GMM[m].pi< GMM[m+1].pi)
20: GMM[m] = oassign(toSwap,GMM[m+1],GMM[m])
21: end for
22: c = 0
23: p = 0
24: toInclude= true
25: for m = 1 to B do
26: c = c+GMM[m].pi
27: p = oassign(toInclude, p+ c, p)
28: toInclude= oassign(c > c f ,false,toInclude)
29: end for
30: return p > cthr
31: end procedure
Finally, it uses the B largest components by weight to deter-
mine whether the pixel is part of the background (lines 22–30).
Note that Mmax and B are algorithmic constants, independent
of the input video streams.
Theorem 2. The background subtraction algorithm in Algo-
rithm 2 is data-oblivious per Definition 1, with public param-
eters Mmax and B (which are known constants).
Proof. The simulator chooses a random pixel value x and
simply runs the algorithm. It outputs the trace produced by
the algorithm.
Lines 6–7 are executed exactly Mmax times. Here, the loop
variable m is public information. Line 6 has fixed access
patterns. The function UPDATEGAUSSIAN performs a set
of arithmetic operations independent of the value of x, via
oassign operations using the condition value isDummy. The
function updates The access patterns of line 7 therefore only
depend on m.
SORTBYWEIGHT in line 9 sorts the GMM array using the
oblivious sorting primitive osort. Hence, the access patterns
of this step only depend on the length of GMM, which is Mmax.
Lines 12–13 are executed exactly Mmax times. The function
GETDISTANCE computes the distance of x from GMM[m] via
arithmetic operations, independent of the value of x. Thus,
the access patterns of line 12 thus depends only on the loop
variable m. Line 13 has fixed access patterns. Lines 15–16
have fixed access patterns, and the access patterns of line
17 depends only on Mmax. Lines 19–20 are executed exactly
Mmax−1 times. The access patterns of both lines depend only
on the loop variable m.
Lines 22–24 have fixed access patterns. Lines 26–28 are
executed exactly Mmax times. The access patterns of line 26
depend only on the loop variable m; lines 27 and 28 have
fixed access patterns.
Thus, the trace produced by the simulator is indistinguish-
able from the trace produced by a real run.
A.2.2 Object detection
Algorithm 3 describes our algorithm for detecting bounding
boxes of objects in an input image. The algorithm maintains
a list L of tuples of the form (parent,bbox), where each
tuple corresponds to a distinct “label” that will eventually be
mapped to each blob. Initially, the list L is empty. The parent
field identifies other labels that are connected to the tuple’s
label (explained shortly), and the bbox field maintains the
coordinates of the bounding box of the label (or blob).
The algorithm first scans the image row-wise (lines 6–22).
Whenever a white pixel is detected, the algorithm checks if
any of its neighbors scanned thus far were also white (i.e.,
pixel to the left and the three pixels above). In case at least one
neighbor is white, the pixel is assigned the label of the neigh-
bor with the smallest numerical value, lmin. The algorithm
records that all white neighbors are connected, by setting the
parent fields for each neighboring label to lmin and updat-
ing the bbox field for lmin. In case no neighbor is white, the
pixel is assigned a new label, and a new entry is added to the
list L, with its parent set to the label itself and bbox as the
coordinates of the current pixel.
Next, the algorithm merges the bounding boxes of all con-
nected labels into a single bounding box (lines 23–35). Specif-
ically, for every label l in L, the algorithm first obtains the
parent label of l (say lpar), and then updates the bbox of lpar
to include the bbox of l. It repeats the process recursively
with lpar, until it reaches a root label lroot whose parent
value is the label itself. The process repeats for all labels in
L, until only the root labels are left behind. Each root label
corresponds to a distinct object in the frame.
Theorem 3. The bounding box detection algorithm in Algo-
rithm 3 is data-oblivious, with public parameters N, and the
height and width of the input frame.
Proof. The simulator generates a random frame F of the
given height and width and runs the algorithm. It outputs the
trace produced by the algorithm.
Algorithm 3 Bounding box detection
1: Constants: Maximum number of labels N
2: Input: Frame F
3: procedure BOUNDINGBOXDETECTION(F)
4: Initialize list L of N tuples of type (parent,bbox),
with L[i].parent= i
5: ctr= 1
6: for i = 1 to F.height do
7: for j = 1 to F.width do
8: p = F [i][ j]
9: isWhite= (p 6= 0)
10: (p1, p2, p3, p4) = GETNEIGHBORS(F, i, j)
11: (l1, l2, l3, l4) = GETNEIGHBORLABELS(F, i, j)
12: isNew = (p1 == p2 == p3 == p4 == 0) ∧
isWhite
13: lmin = GETMINLABEL(l1, l2, l3, l4)
14: lmin = oassign(isNew,ctr, lmin)
15: ctr= oassign(¬isNew,ctr+1,ctr)
16: for each label l in {l1, l2, l3, l4} do
17: UPDATEPARENT(L,¬isNew, l, lmin)
18: end for
19: UPDATEBBOX(L,isWhite, lmin, i, j)
20: SETLABEL(F, i, j, lmin)
21: end for
22: end for
23: for i = 1 to N do
24: par= L[i].parent
25: toMerge= (par< i)
26: for j = i to 1 do
27: L[i].parent= oassign(toMerge∧ (par== j),
L[ j].parent,L[i].parent)
28: end for
29: end for
30: for i = 1 to N do
31: for j = 1 to N do
32: toMerge= (L[ j].parent== i)
33: MERGEBBOX(toMerge,L[i].bbox,L[ j].bbox)
34: end for
35: end for
36: return L
37: end procedure
The access patterns of line 4 depends only on N. Line 5
has fixed access patterns.
The loops (lines 6–22) are executed a fixed number of
times, equal to the height and width of the frame. The access
patterns of line 8 depend only on the loop variables i and j,
which are public information. Line 9 has fixed access pat-
terns. In line 10, the function GETNEIGHBORS returns the
four pixels neighboring the input coordinates (i and j), and
its access patterns thus depend only on i and j. Similarly in
line 11, GETNEIGHBORLABELS looks up the labels assigned
to the neighboring pixels, and thus has access patterns that
only depend on i and j. Line 12 has fixed access patterns. In
line 13, GETMINLABEL selects the minimum of the input
values using oassign operations, and thus has fixed access
Algorithm 4 Object cropping
1: Constants: Upper bounds on object dimensions height, width
2: Input: Frame F , bounding box coordinates bbox
3: procedure CROPOBJECT(F , bbox)
4: Initialize an empty buffer buf with width = F.width and
height = height
5: for i = 1 to F .height do
6: cond= (i == bbox.top)
7: COPYROWS(cond, i,F,buf)
8: end for
9: Initialize an empty buffer obj with width = width and
height = height
10: for i = 1 to F .width do
11: cond= (i == bbox.left)
12: COPYCOLS(cond, i,buf,obj)
13: end for
14: end procedure
patterns. Lines 14–15 have fixed access patterns. In line 17,
UPDATEPARENT uses oaccess combined with oassign to
update L[l].parent to lmin; it thus has access patterns that
only depend on the length N of the array L. In line 18, UP-
DATEBBOX similarly uses oaccess combined with oassign
to update L[lmin].bbox with the current coordinates i and j; its
access patterns therefore only depend on L’s length N. In line
19, SETLABEL sets the label of the pixel at F [i][ j] to lmin; its
access patterns depend only on the loop variables i and j.
Lines 24–28 are run N times. The access patterns of line
24 depend only on the loop variable i. Line 25 has fixed
access patterns. Line 27 is executed i times, which is public
information; also, the access patterns of this line only depend
on the loop variables i and j.
Lines 32–33 are run N2 times. The access patterns of line
32 only depend on the loop variable j. In line 33, the function
MERGEBBOX uses oassign operations to update L[i].bbox
with L[ j].bbox; it therefore has fixed access patterns.
Thus, the trace produced by the simulator is indistinguish-
able from the trace produced by a real run of the algo-
rithm.
A.2.3 Object cropping
Algorithms 4 and 5 together describe Visor’s oblivious crop-
ping algorithm. Visor crops out images of a fixed upper
bounded size using Algorithm 4, and then scales up the ROI
within the cropped image using Algorithm 5 (as described in
§7.3). The pseudocode is self-explanatory.
Theorem 4. The object cropping algorithm in Algorithm 4
is data-oblivious, with public parameters equal to the dimen-
sions of the input frame, and the upper bounds on the object
dimensions height and width.
Proof. The simulator generates a random frame of the given
dimensions, along with a bounding box bbox with random co-
ordinates. It then runs the algorithm, and outputs the produced
trace.
Algorithm 5 Object resizing
1: Input: Object buffer O, bounding box coordinates bbox
2: procedure RESIZEOBJECT(O, bbox)
3: RESIZEHORIZONTALLY(O, bbox, false)
4: TRANSPOSE(O)
5: RESIZEHORIZONTALLY(O, bbox, true)
6: TRANSPOSE(O)
7: end procedure
8: procedure RESIZEHORIZONTALLY(O, bbox)
9: for i = 1 to O.height do
10: for j = 1 to O.width do
11: p = PIXELOFINTEREST( j,bbox)
12: a = oaccess(O[i], p)
13: b = oaccess(O[i], p+1)
14: O[i][ j] = LINEARINTERPOLATE(a,b)
15: end for
16: end for
17: end procedure
The access patterns of line 4 depend only the frame’s width,
and the parameter width, both of which are known to the
simulator. Lines 6–7 run a fixed number of times, equal to the
height of the frame. Line 6 has fixed access patterns. In line
7, COPYROWS uses oassign to copy pixels from F into buf;
its access patterns thus only depend on the loop variable i, the
width of the frame, and the parameter height.
The access patterns of line 9 depend only the parameters
width and height. Lines 11–12 run a fixed number of times,
equal to the width of the frame. Line 11 has fixed access
patterns. In line 12, COPYCOLS uses oassign to copy pixels
from buf into obj; its access patterns thus only depend on
the loop variable i, and the parameters height and width.
Thus, the trace produced by the simulator is indistinguish-
able from the trace produced by a real execution.
Theorem 5. The object resizing algorithm in Algorithm 5 is
data-oblivious, with public parameters equal to the dimen-
sions of the input object O.
Proof. The simulator generates a random object buffer with
the given dimensions, along with a bounding box bbox with
random coordinates. It then runs the algorithm, and outputs
the produced trace.
The function Transpose transposes the object buffer, and
thus its access patterns only depend on the dimensions of O.
The function ResizeHorizontally works as follows. The
loops (lines 9–15) are executed a fixed number of times, equal
to the dimensions of O. Line 11 computes the location of
the pixels to be used for linearly interpolating the current
pixel, using a set of arithmetic operations; it thus has fixed
access patterns. Lines 12 and 13 have access patterns that only
depend on the width of O. In line 14, LINEARINTERPOLATE
linearly interpolates the current pixel’s value using a set of
arithmetic operations; the access patterns of this line thus
depend only on the loop variables.
Algorithm 6 Feature detection
1: Input: Object buffer O, maximum number of candidate key-
points Ntemp, maximum number of actual keypoints N
2: procedure DETECTFEATURES(O, Ntemp, N)
3: Initialize an empty list L of size Ntemp for candidate key-
points, and a list H of size N for features of final keypoints
4: ctr= 0
5: images= GETDIFFERENCEOFGAUSSIANS(O)
6: for each pixel p in images do
7: nbrs= GETNEIGHBORS(p)
8: isExtrema= CHECKEXTREMA(p,nbrs)
9: k = (p,nbrs)
10: for i = 1 to Ntemp do
11: L[i] = oassign(isExtrema∧ i == ctr,k,L[i])
12: end for
13: ctr= oassign(isExtrema∧ctr< Ntemp,ctr+1,ctr)
14: end for
15: for i = 1 to Ntemp do
16: isRobust= CHECKROBUSTNESS(L[i])
17: L[i] = oassign(isRobust,L[i],null)
18: end for
19: osort(L) such that non-null values move to the head of L
20: for i = 1 to N do
21: bbox= CALCNEIGHBORHOODBBOX(L[i])
22: roi= CROPOBJECT(images,bbox)
23: H[i] = CALCORIENTATIONHIST(L[i],roi)
24: end for
25: return H
26: end procedure
Thus, the trace produced by the simulator is indistinguish-
able from the trace produced by a real execution.
A.2.4 Object tracking
Algorithm 6 describes the feature detection phase of the object
tracking. We omit a description of feature matching since it
is oblivious by default.
The algorithm first creates a set of increasingly blurred
versions of the input image (line 5). Then, it identifies a set
of candidate keypoints in these blurred images, i.e., pixels
that are the maximum and minimum of all their neighbors
(lines 6–14). This set of keypoints is further refined to identify
those that are robust to changes in illumination (i.e., have high
intensity), or represent a “corner” (lines 15–18). Mathemati-
cally, these tests involve the computation of derivatives at the
candidate point, and then a comparison of the results against
a threshold. Candidates that fail these tests are discarded.
Finally, for each keypoint, the algorithm constructs a fea-
ture descriptor. It calculates the “orientation” of the pixels
around the keypoint (within a 16×16 neighborhood) based
on pixel differences, and then constructs a histogram over
the computed values (lines 20–14). The histogram acts as the
keypoint’s descriptor.
Theorem 6. The feature detection algorithm in Algorithm 6
is data-oblivious, with public parameters equal to the dimen-
sions of the input image O, and upper bounds Ntemp and N.
Proof. The simulator generates a random image buffer with
the given dimensions, and then runs the algorithm. It outputs
the trace produced by the algorithm.
Line 5 performs Gaussian blurring operations on the input
image O, which perform a convolution of the input image with
a specified kernel (i.e., a small matrix). The access patterns
of these matrix multiplications are fixed, and independent of
the values of the matrices.
The loop (lines 6–14) runs a fixed number of times, the
value of which depends on the resolution of the input image,
which is public. Line 7 fetches the neighbors of the current
pixel; its access patterns are therefore dependent only on co-
ordinates of the loop variable, which is public. Line 8 checks
the value of the current pixel with the obtained nbrs using
oassign operations, and thus has fixed access patterns, inde-
pendent of the values. Line 9 has fixed access patterns. The
loop in lines 10–12 executes a fixed Ntemp number of times.
The access patterns of line 11 depend only on the public loop
variable. Line 13 has fixed access patterns.
The loop in lines 15–18 executes a fixed Ntemp number of
times. Line 16 has fixed access patterns. The access patterns
of line 17 depend only on the public loop variable. Line 19
has fixed access patterns that depend only on the size Ntemp
of the array L.
The loop in lines 15–18 executes a fixed N number of times.
The function CALCNEIGHBORHOODBBOX in Line 21 com-
putes the bounding box of the 16×16 neighborhood of the
current keypoint using arithmetic operations, and has fixed
access patterns. The access patterns of the function CROP-
OBJECT depend only on the dimensions of the input image
O (which is public) and the resolution of the bounding box,
which is fixed (from Theorem 4). The function CALCORIEN-
TATIONHIST performs arithmetic operations, and the access
patterns of line 23 depend only on the public loop variable.
Thus, the trace produced by the simulator is indistinguish-
able from the trace produced by a real execution.
B Impact of video encoder padding
In Visor, the source video streams are padded at the camera
to prevent information leakage due to variations in bitrate of
the encrypted network traffic. However, it may not always be
possible to modify legacy cameras to incorporate padding.
This security guarantee also comes at the cost of performance
and increased network bandwidth.
While we recommend padding the video streams for secu-
rity, we studied the impact of disabling video encoder padding
on Visor so as to aid practitioners in taking an informed deci-
sion between security and performance. Disabling padding
has two implications on Visor.
First, the encoded stream may also contain interframes in
addition to keyframes (see §6.1). Thus, we have devised an
oblivious routine for interframe prediction, which is described
in Appendix B.1. Second, the performance overhead of Visor
(∼2×–6×) reduces to a range of ∼1.6×–2.9×. This is due
to lower interframe decoding latency and smaller number of
decoded bits per row of blocks (which are obliviously sorted).
B.1 Inter-prediction for interframes
Inter-predicted blocks use previously decoded frames as refer-
ence (either the previous frame, or the most recent keyframe).
Obliviousness of inter-prediction requires that the reference
block (which frame, and block’s coordinates therein) remains
private during decoding. Otherwise, an attacker observing
access patterns during inter-prediction can discern the motion
of objects across frames. Furthermore, some blocks even in
interframes can be intra-predicted for coding efficiency, and
oblivious approaches need to conceal whether an interframe
block is inter- or intra-predicted. A naïve, but inefficient, ap-
proach to achieve obliviousness is to access all blocks in
possible reference frames at least once—if any block is left
untouched, its location its leaked to the attacker.
We leverage properties of video streams to make our obliv-
ious solution efficient: (i) Most blocks in interframes are
inter-predicted (∼99% blocks in our streams); and (ii) Co-
ordinates of reference blocks are close to the coordinates
of inter-predicted blocks (in a previous frame), e.g., 90% of
blocks are radially within 1 to 3 blocks. These properties
enable two optimizations. First, we assume every block in an
interframe is inter-predicted. Any error due to this assumption
on intra-predicted blocks is minor in practice. Second, instead
of scanning all blocks in prior frames, we only access blocks
within a small distance of the current block. If the reference
block is indeed within this distance, we fetch it obliviously
using oaccess; else, (in the rare cases) we use the block at
the same coordinates in the previous frame as reference.
C Impact of disabling hyperthreading
Visor requires hyperthreading to be disabled in the underlying
system for security (see §3). In contrast, in our evaluation,
the baseline system leveraged hyperthreading to maximize its
throughput.
We measured the impact of disabling hyperthreading on
Visor’s performance to be 5%. Visor heavily utilizes vector
units due to the increased data-level parallelism of oblivious
algorithms, leaving little space for performance improvement
when hyperthreading is enabled [50]. As such, the increased
security comes with negligible performance overhead.
Disabling hyperthreading in cloud VMs is considered to be
a good practice due to the reduced impact of microarchitec-
tural data-sampling vulnerabilities that affect commodity Intel
CPUs (not just Intel SGX) [16,88,101,102]. Our experiments
demonstrate that disabling hyperthreading in the baseline sys-
tem reduces its performance by 30%; bridging considerably
the performance gap between Visor and insecure baseline
systems in hyperthreading-disabled cloud deployments.
